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In the last two decades, emerging markets have gained ground in the global market of 
mergers and acquisitions and are expected to continue doing so. Although it is fairly common 
for developed-market firms to acquire developing-market targets, the other way around is still 
a relatively new phenomenon. As such, the stock markets behaviour towards announcements 
of such acquisitions is still an underdeveloped research area with ambiguous answers. The event 
study methodology was used to examine whether developing-market acquiring firms are able 
to create value for their shareholders when targeting developed-market firms and what are the 
drivers of value creation. The sample used consisted of 300 deals from acquirers of ten different 
developing countries from 2005 until the beginning of 2020. The results reveal that, on average, 
these transactions create value for the acquirer’s shareholders, and that hiring financial advisors 
contributes positively to value creation. The growth rate of the home country and being state-
owned also contribute to value creation, but the firm size, belonging to the high-tech industry 
and paying all-cash, on the other hand, were found to have a statistically significant negative 
impact on the value created. Lastly, managerial implications were drawn as well as openings 
for future research. 
 




Nas últimas duas décadas, os mercados emergentes têm vindo a ganhar terreno no mercado 
global de fusões e aquisições e prevê-se que continuem a fazê-lo. Embora seja bastante comum 
empresas de países desenvolvidos adquirirem empresas de países em desenvolvimento, o 
inverso é ainda um fenómeno relativamente recente. Como tal, o comportamento dos mercados 
financeiros após o anúncio destas aquisições é ainda uma área de investigação subdesenvolvida 
e com respostas ambíguas. A event study methodology foi utilizada para examinar se as 
empresas de países em desenvolvimento são capazes de criar valor para os seus acionistas 
quando compram empresas de países desenvolvidos, e que fatores influenciam essa criação de 
valor. Foi usada uma amostra de 300 transações de empresas compradoras de dez países em 
desenvolvimento, no período entre 2005 e o início de 2020. Os resultados revelam que, em 
média, estas transações criam valor para os acionistas do comprador e que a contratação de 
consultores financeiros contribui positivamente para a criação de valor. A taxa de crescimento 
do país de origem e o facto de ser estatal também contribuem positivamente, mas a dimensão 
da empresa, fazer parte do sector da alta tecnologia e o pagamento total em dinheiro, por outro 
lado, impactam negativamente a capacidade de criação de valor da transação. Por último, foram 
desenhadas implicações para a gestão, bem como sugestões de futura investigação. 
 
Palavras-chave: multinacionais de mercados emergentes; criação de valor; aquisições 
internacionais; efeitos patrimoniais. 
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Cross-border acquisitions arise naturally in emerging countries following their home 
country’s growth and incorporation into the global economy. Companies seek an outward 
strategic expansion through cross-border acquisitions as competition increases in their home 
countries, from both their local competitors and from foreign internationals that have entered 
their domestic market. The number of acquisition and cross-border acquisition deals has grown 
overall in the last two decades, especially marked by the 1990s exponential growth, during the 
so-called fifth merger wave. Ayabr and Ficici (2009) called emerging market companies who 
expand internationally, EMMs (emerging-market multinationals). According to McKinsey’s 
study in 2015, there are three main motives for EMMs to pursue cross-border deals (ordered by 
popularity): To acquire strategic resources (i.e. know-how, brands, or technology); to gain 
access to natural resources; and to penetrate new markets or sustain the existing ones. However, 
as emerging markets mature, EMMs have moved their internationalization strategy from 
acquiring strategic resources to tapping new markets. In short, emerging markets have become 
global centres of FDI, attracting foreign investment through cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, and they have become global players themselves using M&A as the strategy for 
their aggressive expansion. 
The market reactions, and thus, value creation or destruction arising from cross-border 
acquisitions is a fairly mature research topic. However, it is mostly focused on deals involving 
US or other developed countries enterprises. The rise in the number of cross-border M&As 
involving developing-country firms is a relatively new phenomenon, both as acquirers and as 
targets. Therefore, the academic research on value creation for the acquirers is still quite limited.  
There are many determining factors in cross-border acquisitions from developing-country 
firms that differ considerably from those of developed-country firms. Malhotra and Zhu (2008) 
say that “compared with firms from developed-market, developing-country firms tend to be 
younger and smaller; they lack international experience and exposure; their domestic capital 
market is less developed and investors are not as sophisticated; their government regulation, 
corporate governance and cultural background are more distant from the developed target 
country”.  Bruner, Conroy, Estrada, Kritzman and Li (2002) also point out that “emerging 
markets differ from developed ones in areas such as accounting, transparency, liquidity, 
corruption, volatility, governance, taxes and transaction costs and these differences are quite 
likely to affect firm valuation”. This list of differences may cause acquisitions from emerging-
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market firms to be riskier and more challenging than those from develop-market acquirers. 
Financial markets reflect this disparity and the reactions of the acquisition announcements may 
be different according to the origin of the acquirer. Hence, the way emerging-market firms’ 
market value changes after acquisitions becomes a relevant topic for research. 
A relatively new phenomenon can be observed where emerging-market firms acquire 
developed-market ones. As Malhotra and Zhu (2008) point out, it is often seen developed-
economy firms acquiring developing-economy firms, and it is rarely the other way around. 
Narayan and Thenmozhi (2014) claim that “successful emerging market firms, armed with 
stronger balance sheets, internal accruals, better borrowing capacity and a desire to obtain a 
global footprint will continue to engage in acquisition of targets from developed markets”. 
Thus, this new phenomenon is not a temporary one and is an increasingly relevant research 
topic. 
This paper examines the market reactions for emerging market acquirers who target 
developed-market firms.  It will examine how different firm and deal characteristics affect the 
value creation of the transaction. Special attention will be given to the impact of the use of 
financial advisors and of corporate governance practices on value creation. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis building 
2.1. Value creation in cross-border acquisitions  
The extant literature on value creation from cross-border acquisitions is not consensual. 
Some claim positive returns for the acquirer and others allege negative returns, both from 
developed-market and emerging-market acquirers. Some studies that conclude positive returns 
for the acquirer in a developed market are: Martynova and Renneboog (2008), which shows a 
correlation between the corporate governance standards of the acquirer and the target and the 
returns from the cross-border acquisitions; Cakici, Hessel and Tandon (1996) shows significant 
positive returns for the bidder firms in developed countries (sample of firms from Japan, UK, 
Australia and The Netherlands) acquiring US companies, but found no gains for the US firms 
acquiring foreign firms, and no consistent correlations between hypothesized independent 
variables and the acquirer’s return; Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2004) studied acquisitions with 
developed-country acquirers and emerging-country targets from 1998 to 2002 and found 
positive market reactions for both the acquirer and the target; Benou, Gleason and Madura 
3 
 
(2007) used a sample of high tech companies and found positive but insignificant returns for 
the acquirer but positive and significant returns for the target firms, with higher abnormal 
returns for both when a top-tier financial advisor is contracted and when there is high media 
attention; Francis, Hassan and Sun (2008) also found positive average returns in a sample of 
US acquiring firms, although domestic acquisitions had higher returns than cross-border ones. 
Nonetheless, several articles claim to have found negative average returns for acquirers, to 
name a few: Kuipers, Miller and Patel (2009) analyzed a sample of acquisitions from 
developed-country firms acquiring US firms and found the returns to be negative, partly due to 
the level of creditor rights in the acquirer’s country; Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Wang and Xie 
(2008) claim that there is a relationship between corporate governance and shareholder 
protection of the firms and the deal premia, and although “improvements in accountability and 
transparency are positively valued by the market”, the average returns are negative in both. 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) concluded US firms who acquire cross-border targets get a 
lower stock return and experience a lower increase in operating performance than those who 
acquire domestic targets. 
The same picture can be observed in the literature of emerging-market firms’ acquisitions. 
Bhagat, Malhotra and Zhu (2010) discovered positive average returns, and that these returns 
are positively related to corporate governance measures in the target country. Boateng, Qian 
and Tianle (2008) concluded that “cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese firms 
experience significant and positive wealth gains for shareholders of the acquiring firms”. 
Malhotra and Zhu (2008) found that Indian firms’ value after acquiring US firms increases for 
the three following days, and after that, it decreases gradually until the returns become 
significantly negative. Aybar and Ficici (2009) state that cross-border acquisitions, on average,  
lead to value destruction for emerging-market firms, after analyzing a sample of deals from 
firms mainly from Latin America and Asia. Chen and Young (2009) considered a sample of 
cross-border deals from Chinese companies and obtained average negative returns, which could 
be caused by the fact that the Chinese government is the biggest shareholder in most of the 
completed deals, and that could lead investors to find the cross-border deal less favourable. 
2.2. Cross-border acquisitions performed by emerging market acquirer and a 
developed market target 
As mentioned above, this wave of transactions is relatively recent, and thus, there is still 
limited research on them. Narayan and Thenmozhi (2014) concluded that such deals lead to 
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value destruction in more than half the cases. Although not focused solely on the topic, 
Chernykh, Liebenberg and Macias (2011) concluded that “emerging market acquirers 
experience positive announcement returns when the target is from a developed market”, while 
acquisitions with both emerging market acquirers and targets have insignificant abnormal 
returns. Rani, Yadav and Jain (2015) found that for Indian acquiring firms, the returns are on 
average positive and significant when engaging in cross-border transactions and they are higher 
when targets are from developed economies. 
Acquisitions are a relevant and notable form of FDI (foreign direct investment) and, 
theoretically, companies undertake FDI when they hold some firm-specific advantages that 
allow them to have a competitive position in their domestic market as well as to be profitable 
in foreign markets, offsetting the additional costs of operating abroad (Zaheer, 1995). Kuo, 
Ning, Strange and Wang (2014) mention that acquisitions bring risk diversification and 
earnings stabilization, as the market returns in different geographical areas are usually not 
highly correlated, and capabilities enhancement, since it is expected to happen some sort of 
knowledge transfer between the acquirer and the target. It follows that it is expected for firms 
to undertake FDI when there are projections of future synergetic benefits. Assuming markets 
are efficient - meaning the prices reflect all available information - the value of the acquiring 
firm should go up with an acquisition, reflecting the firm’s ability to profit in the new entered 
market, the risk diversification, earnings stabilization, knowledge transfer and the future 
synergetic benefits. 
However, there are some obstacles for the value creation that could explain why some 
negative results were observed. Some factors that might affect value creation by emerging-
market firms that are pointed out by Narayan and Thenmozhi (2014) are: developing-country 
firms still have little experience in cross-border acquisitions, which can lead to a lower efficacy 
in valuing and choosing targets; they usually finance such deals with debt rather than with 
internal retained income, inducing greater pressure on future success and cash flows; and lastly, 
they have smaller negotiation power in international acquisition deals, which, most often, 
results in emerging-market acquirers ending up paying a higher premium than a developed-
market acquirer would. In addition to this, Seth, Pettit and Song (2002) identified three main 
underlying motives for the pursuit of acquisitions: synergy seeking, managerialism and hubris. 
In managerial or hubris-based acquisitions, transactions are realized in the pursuit of managers’ 
personal interest, or they involve managers’ mistakes on the target valuation. They found that 
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the motive for the transaction plays a big role in value creation, such that deals that destroyed 
value were originated from managerialism or hubris-based M&As, as opposed to synergetic-
oriented. 
All the factors mentioned above lead to a sense of scepticism from investors, which is 
reflected in the market’s reaction to acquisitions. However, it seems fair to believe the gains 
that come from acquiring developed-market targets – which come from the penetration of a 
new market, the acquisition of strategic assets, the risk diversification, earnings stabilization, 
capabilities enhancement and from the future synergetic benefits - outweigh the losses. This is 
especially plausible to assume considering developed-market firms are generally more mature, 
which is associated with higher transfer of capabilities (namely knowledge), earnings 
stabilization and of risk diversification. Hence, overall, there should be value creation for the 
acquirer. On this ground, the first hypothesis is drawn: 
H1: There is value creation for the emerging-market firm when acquiring a developed-
market target. 
This main hypothesis will be studied together with the drivers for value creation. There is 
evidence that leads to believe corporate governance practices and the hiring of financial 
advisors play a role in shareholder wealth creation in acquisitions of developed-market firms 
by EMMs. Thus, the impact of these two variables will be examined.  
2.3. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a relatively new concept that gained force as a managerial 
discipline after the last financial crisis and scandals of firms’ moral conduct. A definition of 
corporate governance can be found in the “Cadbury Code”, and it states that “corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 1992). 
Although corporate governance is not as developed in emerging markets, they are naturally 
responding to this global trend and have a growing pressure from activist shareholders. 
McKinsey’s report Perspectives on Corporate Finance and Strategy from 2002 has a chapter 
on Corporate governance develops in emerging markets where it is indicated that both domestic 
and foreign investors in emerging markets value corporate governance and reward firms with 
stricter standards. Investors claimed they were willing to pay a premium for a well-governed 
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firm, and in some countries, that premium was as high as 30%. Also, 76% of investors of Asian 
firms say they care about board practices at least as much as they do about financial issues.  
Corporate governance can affect the firm’s valuation. Several studies have shown a 
positive correlation between good corporate governance practices and higher firm valuation, 
for both developed and developing-market firms. To name a few: Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and 
Zimmermann (2006) found a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm 
valuation for Swiss firms; and Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003) found that for 
German companies, “investors are willing to pay significant premiums for well-governed 
companies, and that the valuation of a firm is at least as dependent on governance practices as 
it is on financial issues”. And for emerging-market firms, the following studies are relevant: 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) claim that corporate governance positively affects the valuation of 
Korean firms, and that this effect is likely to be causal; Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012) state that 
“better corporate frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, lower cost of 
capital, better performance and more favourable treatment of all stakeholders” in emerging 
markets; Black, Carvalho and Gorga (2011) found that there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of corporate governance on market value, in a sample of Brazilian, Indian, 
Korean and Russian firms; Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou (2006) and Lei and 
Song (2008) reached the same conclusion for Hong Kong firms, Bebczuk (2005) for 
Argentinian firms; Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) for Russian; Balasubramaniam, Black 
and Khanna (2010) for a Indian; and Klapper and Love (2004) for a sample of firms across 25 
emerging markets. 
Corporate Governance can be measured in a myriad of ways. Nonetheless, board 
composition is a central issue that receives much attention. When it comes to the board 
composition, there are two main good practices, which are part of the second principle of ICGN 
(International Corporate Governance Network) global governance principles: 
● Separation of CEO and Chair – There should be a clear distinction of the role of the 
CEO and of the chairman, as the chair of the board should be an independent non-
executive director.  
● Independence in the board – Independent directors are non-executive directors that do 
not represent any stakeholder. ICGN states that the board should be composed of a 
majority of independent non-executive directors (>50%) but established the minimum 
acceptable of one-third independent directors (>33%). 
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Several studies have focused on the impact that the separation of the two roles has on firm 
performance. Some found that firms that separate the responsibilities outperform those with 
CEO duality (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993), while others found the opposite 
effect (Brickley, Coles and Jarrel, 1997; Donadson and Davids, 1991), and others even found 
no link between the two variables (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson’s, 1998; Daily, 1995). 
The board’s independence is likely to be the most important corporate governance factor, 
and although there are still contradictions in the literature, most evidence shows that having 
more independent members in the board lead to better performance and higher valuations. Black 
et al. (2006) claim that for Korean firms, the ones who have at least 50% outside directors have 
around 40% higher share prices. Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) studied a sample of 
22 countries, 7 of which were emerging markets, and found a positive relationship between 
higher percentage of independent members in the board and firms’ valuation, especially for 
firms in countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders. Black and Kim (2007) 
also found a positive impact on cumulative markets abnormal returns and on Tobin’s q (firm’s 
market value/firm’s total assets) for Korean firms. On the other hand, Lo, Wong and Firth 
(2010) studied a sample of Chinese firms and observed a significant negative effect of 
independence in the board and firms’ gross profit ratio in related party transactions.  
Despite the contradicting literature on the CEO duality and board independence’s impact, 
it is fair to deduce that if corporate governance is beneficial to a firm’s performance and 
valuation, these two standard principles of good corporate governance will contribute positively 
to both performance and valuation. Additionally, it seems logical that factors that influence a 
firm’s better performance and valuation would also influence the firm’s stock return after 
acquisitions. Thus, better corporate governance (i.e. complying with the two principles above) 
of the acquirer should lead to a higher value captured in cross-border expansions.  
Supporting this hypothesis, Bris and Cabolis (2008) claim better corporate governance 
practices - which they tested with shareholders’ protection and national accounting standards - 
lead to higher abnormal returns. Byrd and Hickman (1992) studied in specific the effect of the 
fraction of outside directors of the acquirer on the stock market’s reaction to tender offers and 
observed that higher independence ratios lead to higher returns. Also, the two corporate 
governance practices stated above are both internal and do not include nationwide standards, in 
which emerging markets are still not as developed. However, Klapper and Love (2004) found 
that firms operating in a poor corporate governance environment will get higher benefits when 
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engaging internally in good corporate governance practices than they would if they were in a 
rich corporate governance environment, meaning the advantages of internal good corporate 
governance practices are augmented in developing markets. Hence, corporate governance is a 
relevant factor to analyse. 
To add on this logic, as earlier mentioned, Seth, Pettit and Song (2002) found that the 
underlying managerial motivation is a determining factor in the success of the acquisition. If 
good corporate governance measures are in place, it is much less likely for the managers to 
pursue their personal interests, since there is better supervision by the board. In short, with 
better corporate governance comes more synergy seeking acquisitions and, thus, more 
successful ones. 
The central hypothesis states that good corporate governance practices lead to higher 
returns for the acquirer. It is divided into two more specific hypotheses, that follow: 
H2 a): The separation of the CEO and chairman roles positively affects the returns for the 
emerging-market firm when acquiring a developed-market target. 
H2 b): Having a high percentage of independent directors in the board positively affects 
the returns for the emerging-market firm when acquiring a developed-market target.   
2.4. Financial advisors 
The acquirer can hire a financial advisor, who is a firm advising about the financial 
requirements for the deal to be completed. Financial advisors are usually known as investment 
banks, and they can be helpful in several points, as they are said to be capable of lowering the 
contracting costs, performing better due diligence and taking care of financial and legal issues 
(Angwin, 2001; Boeh, 2011), as well as reducing the transaction cost and information 
asymmetry (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). They can also be an asset in advising on which firms 
to target and which financing structure to follow, in sharing their knowledge of financial 
markets and mitigating cultural differences.  
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) examined the role of financial advisors on M&As 
and figured firms are more inclined to hire financial advisors when they are not confident about 
being able to successfully complete the deal on their own, which usually happens in three cases: 
when the transaction is big; when they do not have much experience and expertise in “in-house” 
transactions and when transactions are less likely to be diversifying. To be more precise, 
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Golubov et al. (2012) found that in-house acquisitions had a median relative size of 0.059, while 
the median for acquisitions using financial advisors was 0.222, supporting the idea that firms 
are less confident to make decisions themselves when the targets are sizable. For the second 
case, the authors observed that as firms gain more experience in M&As they become less likely 
to call for advisors, and it is common to form a dedicated internal M&A team with the necessary 
capabilities. Because emerging-market firms are relatively new players, the chances of firms 
having previously acquired experience and expertise in M&A transactions should be smaller 
than for developed-market ones. Thirdly, if firms are more inclined to hire an advisor when the 
deal is more diversifying, then cross-border acquisitions should be more likely to have the aid 
of financial advisors compared to domestic acquisitions.  
Academics have elaborated on the relationship between the employment of financial 
advisors and acquisitions returns.  Most literature is dedicated to finding the impact of different 
advisors’ characteristics on the abnormal returns, and a characteristic to which plenty of 
attention has been given is the advisor’s reputation. Bao and Edmans (2011) and Kale, Kini and 
Ryan Jr (2003) say that there is a connection between the advisor perceived quality and M&A 
returns. Golubov et al. (2012) agree, stating that top-tier advisors achieve higher returns for the 
acquirer than non-top-tier ones. On the other hand, Ismail (2009) and Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
find a negative effect of advisor reputation on acquirer’s returns. Several other authors found 
no evidence of the role of the advisor’s reputation on the M&A returns (Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb 
and Unverhau, 2009; Walter, Yawson and Yeung, 2008). Another popular topic of research is 
the effect of hiring “boutique” (smaller and specialized) investment banks (Song, Wei and 
Zhou, 2013), which were observed in their article to be beneficial. 
In this paper, there will not be a classification according to advisors’ reputation. Instead, it 
is the impact of hiring any financial advisor, against performing the acquisition without hiring 
any, that will be studied. This relevant since financial advisors usually request enormous fees 
and it is, thus, interesting to understand if the value they bring offsets the high costs associated 
with them. 
According to Golubov et al. (2012), financial advisors participate in around 85% of 
mergers and acquisitions, which means the majority of companies believe the high costs of 
hiring those advisors are offset by the benefits they bring. Due to this and to the long history 
and presence of investment banks and other financial advisors, it seems fair to assume financial 
advisors do bring value and, hence, higher abnormal returns for acquirers. Allied to this logic, 
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is the fact that emerging markets do not have a vast knowledge about most developed markets, 
which increases the need for external expertise. The hypothesis is then formulated as follows: 
H3: Hiring financial advisors lead to higher abnormal returns for the emerging-market firm 
acquiring a developed-market target. 
3. Methodology and dataset  
3.1. Event study methodology  
The event study methodology is applied in most of the studies in the area (Aybar and Ficici, 
2009, Bhagat et al., 2010, Boateng et al., 2008, Chari et al., 2004, Chernykh et al., 2011)  to 
measure the impact of an acquisition on the acquirer stock returns. Chari et al. (2004) claim that 
this method gives the most reliable evidence on M&A value creation. The model estimates 
value creation or destruction using cumulative abnormal stock market reactions. The first step 
to get the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is to find the abnormal returns, which are the 
differences between the expected return (i.e. the return if there was no acquisition) and the 
observed return. For that, the market model was applied. This model assumes the return of the 
market and a given stock are linearly related, and that the stock markets are efficient. Thus, 
with this model, it is possible to calculate the expected returns. For each firm i, the market 
model follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Rit stands for the return of the security i at the moment t, the coefficients αi and 𝛽i stand for 
the intercept and the systematic risk of each acquirer i, respectively, and εit is the error term for 
security i at time t. To calculate coefficients αi and 𝛽i , a period of 90 days was used, from 120 
days before the acquisition announcement (t = - 120) to 30 days before the announcement (t = 
- 30), considering the day of the announcement as the day zero. This time range was chosen as 
it is wide enough to reflect a pattern but short enough not to include many external factors. 
After having the expected return, it is possible to calculate the abnormal returns (ARit) generated 
by each acquisition, using the following equation: 
 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
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Where ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are the ordinary least squares parameters. After having the AR, it is 
possible to calculate the CAR. The CAR is used because the real world behaves differently 
from theory and the stock prices do not adjust immediately, as the market model assumes. That 
is why it is necessary to observe and aggregate more trading days’ returns around the 
acquisition. In this study, three event windows are used: of three (-1, +1), five (-2, +2) and 
eleven days (-5, +5). The following equations were applied: 




And for the event windows, where T1 and T2 are the first and last day of the window:  




3.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
The cumulative abnormal returns are now used as the dependent variable in a multivariate 
model to observe their behaviour and answer the core research question of whether there is 
value creation or destruction: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽3(𝐴𝐺𝐸) + 𝛽4(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐼𝑆𝑂𝑅𝑆) +
𝛽5(𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻) +  𝛽6(𝑇𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷) +  𝛽7(𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻) +  𝛽8(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌) + 𝛽9(𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻) +
 𝛽10(𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽11(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝑇) + 𝛽12(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌) +  𝜀  
The model includes the hypothesized variables and some control variables that bring 
robustness to the model as well as provide material of study. The independent and control 
variables are the following: 
● STATE – A dummy variable stating whether the acquirer is state-owned or not.  
● SIZE –The value of the total assets in the end of the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement was used as a proxy for the size of the acquirer. All values were 
converted into millions of dollars using the currency rate at the respective date. The 
natural logarithm was then applied in order to avoid skewness towards large numbers, 
since the value of assets can differ immensely from firm to firm.  
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● AGE – A variable of the age of the acquirer at the data of the acquisition.  
● HIGHTECH – A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer belongs 
to the industry of high technology. 
● INDUSTRY – A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the industries of the 
acquirer and the target are related.  
● TLISTED – A dummy variable that is 1 when the target company was publicly listed at 
the moment it was acquired.  
● CASH – A dummy variable stating if the acquisition was paid 100% in cash. 
● GROWTH – This variable indicates the growth rate of the acquirer’s country in the year 
prior to the acquisition.  
The variable concerning financial advisors: 
● ADVISORS – A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer hired a 
financial advisor for the transaction and the value of zero otherwise. 
 
And the variables related to corporate governance: 
● BOARDSIZE – The total number of directors in the board. Because in some cases, 
mostly in companies from Israel and South Africa, there were boards of directors with 
a considerably larger size than the average observed, the natural logarithm was also 
applied. 
● INDEPENDENT – A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the percentage of 
independent members in the board of directors is higher than the median of the whole 
sample. 
● DUALITY – A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO and chair roles are 
exercised by the same person. 
3.3. Sample 
A list of acquisition announcements was extracted from Thomson SDC Platinum database, 
using the time range from January 2005 until January 2020. Along with the date of the 
announcement, the completion status of the deal, the acquirer’s name, the number of financial 
advisors hired by the acquirer, the percentage of consideration paid in cash, the industry 
description, and the public status and country of origin for both the target and the acquirer were 
extracted. The list of acquisitions was then filtered by several restrictions: the acquirer’s country 
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of origin had to be from a country considered by the UN country classification of 2019 as 
developing; the target’s country of origin had to be from a developed country according to the 
same classification; the announced deals considered had to have been completed; the acquirer 
had to be publicly listed, so it is ensured the historical stock prices are accessible; and lastly, 
each acquirer’s nation had to have a minimum of 15 deals in order to be considered, so to 
guarantee there is a representative sample for each country and less noise added to the model.  
The rest of the data was extracted manually, mostly from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
database and from companies’ annual reports. This includes the stock prices for the 90 days 
between 120 and 30 days before the announcement, as well as for the five days before and after 
the announcement date to cover for the three event windows used. For each acquirer firm, the 
following information was also taken: its age, whether it is state-owned or not, its total assets 
in dollars on the year before the announcement, the size of its board of directors, the number of 
independent members in the board and whether there is CEO duality also in the year prior to 
the acquisition. Lastly, the growth rate of all the developing countries in the list was extracted 
for the respective years. 
After applying the restrictions, inevitably losing some deals due to data unavailability, and 
eliminating the outliers, the final sample size obtained was of 300, which is shortened to 236 
when corporate governance variables are added. This happened because the annual report of 
the corresponding acquisition year was not available for some companies, and thus, corporate 
governance data could not be obtained. The final sample included deals from acquirers of ten 
developing countries: Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, and South Korea. The country with the highest amount of deals is China with 68 
transactions, followed by South Korea with 36.  Close to 65% of the sample is from Asian 
countries, and all the BRIC countries are contemplated in the sample. The most targeted 
developed country is the US, with 65 acquisitions. 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
For a better understanding of the dataset gathered, table 1 presents the variables used, along 
with the mean, standard deviation and the correlation matrix. Due to the application of the 
natural logarithm in the variables of size and board size, their standard deviations come in 
smaller scales. Looking at the correlation matrix, it is possible to note that the highest value is 
0.356, which is still far from alarming. Despite this, the Variable Inflation Factors (VIFs) were 
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calculated to ensure no multicollinearity related problems would emerge. The mean VIF is 1.15, 
the highest observed being 1.39. Hence, it is possible to discard the premise of serial 
autocorrelation.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
           Mean        St. Dev                1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 CAR (-1, +1) 0.02 0.07 1      
2 STATE 0.04 0.20 -0.0219 1     
3 SIZE 79553  734169  -0.2246 0.1902 1    
4 AGE 3.40 0.78 -0.0484 0.0631 0.1577 1   
5 HIGHTECH 0.10 0.30 -0.0102 -0.0638 -0.2327 -0.1533 1  
6 INDUSTRY 0.62 0.49 -0.0964 0.0094 0.0742 -0.0401 0.0253 1 
7 TLISTED 0.09 0.29 0.0303 -0.0622 -0.0388 0.0554 -0.1002 0.1391 
8 CASH 0.19 0.39 -0.0915 -0.0367 0.0022 -0.0307 -0.0758 0.0299 
9 GROWTH 0.05 0.04 0.1097 -0.0085 -0.0962 -0.024 0.1164 -0.0147 
10 FINADVISORS 0.33 0.47 0.1607 -0.1372 -0.0185 -0.0906 -0.065 0.001 
11 BOARDSIZE 10.08 3.64 -0.1592 -0.0231 0.356 0.2642 -0.1811 0.0936 
12 INDEPENDENT 0.51 0.50 0.1164 -0.114 -0.1316 -0.004 -0.0637 -0.0405 
13 DUALITY 0.22 0.41 0.04 -0.0508 -0.2014 -0.0471 0.0795 0.0463 
          
    
        
Mean        St. Dev  7 8 9 10 11 12 
7 TLISTED 0.09 0.29 1      
8 CASH 0.19 0.39 0.238 1     
9 GROWTH 0.05 0.04 -0.1309 -0.016 1    
10 FINADVISORS 0.33 0.47 0.1987 0.168 0.0073 1   
11 BOARDSIZE 10.08 3.64 0.0711 -0.0361 0.0369 0.0936 1  
12 INDEPENDENT 0.51 0.50 0.0394 -0.0409 -0.0842 0.0246 -0.1876 1 
13 DUALITY 0.22 0.41 0.0529 0.1522 0.1099 0.0347 -0.2687 0.125 
Note: Assets are in million US dollars 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Stock markets reaction to acquisitions 
To answer the first and main hypothesis, two tables were constructed, one showing the 
abnormal returns for each day starting 5 days before the announcement until 5 days after, and 
another describing the cumulative abnormal returns using the three event windows. Looking at 
table 2, it is possible to find positive abnormal returns from two days before the acquisition 
until one day after. Although statistically insignificant, the higher returns on t=-2 and t=-1 could 
be explained by possible information leaks before the announcement, to which the market 
reacts. It is on the day of the announcement and one day after where the highest returns are 
observed, leading to the deduction that the markets are fairly efficient and adjust rapidly to the 
news. The positive returns on the day of the announcement and the day immediately after are 
both statistically significant at a 1% level.  
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Table 3 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the three event windows. Looking at 
the first panel, which considers the whole sample, it is easy to see that there is value creation, 
as the mean CARs are positive for the three event windows, and more than half the sample 
presents positive returns.  For the first two event windows, the t-test demonstrates a statistical 
significance at a 1% level. Thus, the first hypothesis is verified.  
For a more in-depth understanding, a set of sub-samples was designed. The list of sub-
samples is the following: deals with Asian acquirers, with Non-Asian acquirers, with Chinese 
acquirers, with BRIC acquirers and with US targets. For all sub-samples, the CARs average is 
always positive. From the sub-samples, it is possible to extract that the means are slightly higher 
for Asian acquirers, and that the CARs for Chinese companies are statistically significant and 
positive, which complements Boateng et al. (2008) but opposes Chen and Young (2009) 
conclusions. The CARs for BRIC-country firms are statistically significant and the averages 
are very close to the ones of the whole sample. The other two sub-samples are statistically 
insignificant and, thus, no major conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Table 2. Daily abnormal returns for five days before and after the announcement. 
Day Mean(%) Median (%) Positive market reaction (%) 
-5 0.22% -0.10% 47.33% 
-4 -0.36%*** -0.24% 41.00% 
-3 -0.43% -0.16% 46.67% 
-2 0.11% 0.16% 55.00% 
-1 0.23% 0.01% 50.00% 
0 0.60%*** 0.06% 51.67% 
1 0.79%*** 0.25% 51.67% 
2 -0.32%* -0.28% 45.67% 
3 -0.18% -0.11% 48.00% 
4 -0.08% -0.15% 46.33% 
5 -0.01% -0.18% 44.67% 
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3. CARs for the three event windows. 
CAR  Mean (%) Median (%) Positive market reaction (%) Number of transactions 
For the whole sample     
(-1, +1) 1.62%*** 0.41% 54.33% 300 
(-2, +2) 1.41%*** 1.06% 57.00% 300 
(-5, +5) 0.58% 0.05% 50.33% 300 
For sub-sample of Asian acquirers    
(-1, +1) 1.98%*** 0.54% 56.94% 209 
(-2, +2) 1.85%*** 1.35% 59.81% 209 
(-5, +5) 0.16% -0.38% 47.85% 209 
For sub-sample of Chinese acquirers    
(-1, +1) 1.98%*** 2.32% 60.29% 68 
(-2, +2) 1.98%** 1.96% 64.71% 68 
(-5, +5) 1.24% 1.68% 57.35% 68 
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Table 3 continued. CARs for the three event windows. 
CAR  Mean (%) Median (%) Positive market reaction (%) Number of transactions 
For sub-sample of non-Asian acquirers    
(-1, +1) 0.95% -0.30% 48.35% 91 
(-2, +2) 0.39% 0.43% 50.55% 91 
(-5, +5) 1.54% 0.91% 56.04% 91 
For sub-sample of BRIC acquirers    
(-1, +1) 1.58%*** 0.34% 55.21% 163 
(-2, +2) 1.25%** 1.13% 56.44% 163 
(-5, +5) 0.38% -0.10% 49.69% 163 
For sub-sample of US targets     
(-1, +1) 1.15% 0.20% 53.85% 65 
(-2, +2) 1.43% -0.27% 47.69% 65 
(-5, +5) 1.45% -0.64% 47.69% 65 
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
4.2. Drivers of stock market reactions 
4.2.1 Control variables 
To analyse the role that the different characteristics of the company and of the deal play on 
the market reactions of acquisitions, the cross-sectional analysis was examined. For a more 
detailed interpretation of the coefficients, four models were constructed. Table 4 displays the 
four models. Model 1 only includes the control variables; model 2 adds financial advisors; 
model 3 adds the two corporate governance variables and excludes the financial advisors; and 
finally, model 4 includes the complete set of variables. Because of the mentioned unavailability 
of annual reports, the sample size is smaller for models 3 and 4, which include the corporate 
governance variables. For each model, the three event windows were used, summing up to 12 
combinations. However, model 1 is statistically insignificant for the three windows; model 2 is 
significant at a 5% level for the first two event windows but insignificant for the 11-day 
window; model 3 is only significant for the 2-days event window (5% level); and lastly model 
4 is significant at a 1% level in the first event window and at a 5% in the second, but 
insignificant in the largest window. Special attention was given to the results of model 4 since 
it is the most robust. 
Table 5 goes into deeper detail and presents the CARs for each of the sub-samples built. 
For the sub-samples, only the fourth model with all the variables was presented, with the 2 days 
event window. This was because the fourth model is the most complete and the most statistically 
significant, and the first window is the one with the most positive returns (table 2), and on 
average, the one showing more statistically significant results on all models. Out of the five 
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sub-sample regressions, two are statistically significant: the sub-sample of Asian acquirers and 
of non-Asian acquirers, at a 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
The variable “STATE” was expected to have a negative coefficient, following Chen and 
Young (2009)’s results of investors being more sceptical for cross-border M&As when the 
government is the biggest shareholder, in the case of China. China is the country with the 
highest number of state-owned companies of the whole sample, however, this variable is 
positive and statistically significant in the third model and insignificant in all other significant 
models. In the sub-sample of Chinese firms, where the biggest effect was expected to be seen, 
the variable is insignificant. Thus, being state-owned was not found to have a negative effect, 
but rather, a very small but positive effect. 
Firm size is associated with higher bargaining power and as Chen and Young (2009) say 
“larger firms are more likely to have slack resources for M&A, especially in an emerging 
economy context”. Surprisingly, this analysis found a statistically significant negative effect of 
the acquirer’s size on the markets’ reactions, and this happens in all the sub-samples too. Most 
literature of cross-border M&A in emerging markets find no significant effect of the size of the 
company. However, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) did find a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the bidder’s size on the bidder’s CARs. This effect could be explained 
by Moeller, Schlingemannb and Stulz (2004)’s conclusions which state that “large firms offer 
larger acquisition premiums than small firms and enter acquisitions with negative dollar 
synergy gains”, and also that managerial hubris is more present in big firms than in smaller 
ones. 
The company’s age does not appear to play a role in the success of the acquisition but being 
high tech does. Being related to the high technology industry shows negative coefficients for 
the whole sample, although only statistically significant in model two for (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) 
event windows. This negative effect was also found by Aybar and Ficici (2009). However, the 
same coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the sub-sample of non-Asian 
companies. The sub-sample of Asian companies should then, have a negative coefficient that 
would offset the positive effect observed in the non-Asian sub-set. However, this effect is not 
observed, and the variable is statistically insignificant, which could come from the limitation of 
the samples being too small.   
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EMMs are more likely to acquire firms in a related industry, as these deals are seen as less 
likely to destroy value especially in cross-border acquisitions (Narayan and Thenmozhi, 2014). 
This was observed, as 62.4% of the deals in the sample were from industry-related companies. 
However, no positive impact was found. In fact, although statistically insignificant, the 
coefficients are mostly negative. This result is not atypical, as many other studies in the area 
have also found insignificant coefficients. This may be explained by the fact that diversification 
can bring value which might outweigh the advantage of being in the same industry. An example 
of that is Ghosh (2001) who finds that diversifying acquisitions are more successful than the 
industry-related ones. However, this study finds that market returns do not depend on industry 
relatedness.   
The variable corresponding to the target firm being listed is always statistically 
insignificant and its sign is inconsistent, being mostly positive. As such, no conclusions can be 
taken. 
Payment in cash has a negative effect on shareholders’ wealth creation. Among many 
others, this finding coincides with Moeller et al. (2004) but contradict Narayan and Thenmozhi 
(2014). Several factors could explain this. The first factor could be the need of borrowing money 
when paying in cash instead of stock, which increases the risk of financial distress; another 
possible factor is the fact that cash acquisitions are usually taxable, decreasing the capital gains; 
the risk of synergies not being created is bared solely by the acquirer’s shareholders, instead of 
proportionately shared in the cases of payments in stock, which can make investors less 
confident in the announcement date.   
The growth rate of the acquirer’s country in the year of the acquisition has a positive and 
significant effect (at a 10% level). Yang (2015) found in her study of ownership participation a 
positive relationship between the home country GDP growth rate and the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the (-1, +1) window for cross-border acquisitions by emerging-country firms. It is, 
then, possible to conclude that the higher the economic growth, the more positive is the 
acquisition perceived by investors, probably because the companies are expected to grow 
alongside with their home country’s economy. 
4.2.2 Financial Advisors 
One study closely related to this one, by Li, Li and Wang, also studied the impact of hiring 
financial advisors in cross-border acquisitions of Chinese firms and found a negative effect. 
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However, this study contradicts their results, as the variable is always positive and statistically 
significant for the whole sample. Thus, as hypothesized, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between the use of financial advisors and cumulative abnormal returns.  
As mentioned above, there are several ways in which financial advisors bring value to the 
acquirer. These include knowledge sharing, culture differences mitigation, due diligence 
performance, lowering contracting and transactions costs and reducing information asymmetry.  
It can now be said that the value created does offset the high costs associated with the contract, 
independently of the advisor’s reputation or categorization. This is also true for the sub-sample 
of Asian firms. 
4.2.3 Corporate Governance 
The variables BOARDSIZE, INDEPENDENCE and DUALITY tackle corporate 
governance. As expected, INDEPENDENCE has a positive coefficient and DUALITY has a 
negative one. However, they are insignificant, so they provide no statistical evidence of their 
value creation and destruction. Two different cases can be observed when segregating the 
sample: for the sub-sample of deals with US targets, having an independence ratio above the 
median shows a positive and statistically significant effect; and in the sub-sample of Chinese 
firm there is evidence of the negative effect of CEO duality on the acquisition returns. Lastly, 
the variable BOARDSIZE was, surprisingly, found to have a negative influence in wealth 
creation, as it has a negative and significant (at a 10% level) coefficient. 
In summary, there is no evidence to support the hypotheses 2a and 2b. There is, however, 
evidence of the positive effect of each corporate governance practices on acquisitions in the 
sub-sample of Chinese firms and of deals with US targets. 
 
Table 4. Cross-sectional analysis: CARs for developing-market acquirers. 
             Model 1            Model 2          Model 3            Model 4 
CAR (-1, +1)         
STATE 0.0116*** (0.0206) 0.0145 (0.0204) 0.0055** (0.0233) 0.0124 (0.0231) 
SIZE -0.0031 (0.0014) -0.0033** (0.0014) -0.0042 (0.0017) -0.0042** (0.0017) 
AGE -0.0046 (0.0053) -0.0039 (0.0053) -0.0011 (0.0056) 0.0008 (0.0055) 
HIGHTECH -0.0277 (0.0141) -0.0255* (0.0140) -0.0185 (0.0157) -0.0164 (0.0155) 
INDUSTRY -0.0071 (0.0085) -0.0049 (0.0085) -0.0104 (0.0092) -0.0094 (0.0091) 
TLISTED 0.0138 (0.0147) 0.0068 (0.0148) 0.0178 (0.0161) 0.0108 (0.0161) 
CASH -0.0105 (0.0107) -0.0136 (0.0106) -0.0190 (0.0117) -0.0228* (0.0116) 
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Table 4 continued. Cross-sectional analysis: CARs for developing-market acquirers. 
            Model 1          Model 2         Model 3         Model 4 
GROWTH 0.0130 (0.0095) 0.0141 (0.0095) 0.0264* (0.0143) 0.0254* (0.0141) 
ADVISORS  0.0235*** (0.0089)   0.0265*** (0.0096) 
BOARDSIZE     -0.0211 (0.0149) -0.0258* (0.0148) 
INDEPEN    0.0099 (0.0090) 0.0092 (0.0089) 
DUALITY     -0.0041 (0.0113) -0.0049 (0.0111) 
Intercept 0.0895 (0.0295) 0.0831 (0.0293) 0.1612 (0.0477) 0.1550 (0.0470) 
Observations 300  300  236  236  
R-squared 0.0411  0.0637  0.0985  0.1284  
 
CAR (-2, +2)         
STATE -0.0081 (0.0228) -0.0046 (0.0225) -0.0066 (0.0252) 0.0015 (0.0249) 
SIZE -0.0018 (0.0015) -0.0021 (0.0015) -0.0040** (0.0018) -0.0040** (0.0018) 
AGE -0.0058 (0.0059) -0.0051 (0.0058) -0.0033 (0.0060) -0.0011 (0.0060) 
HIGHTECH -0.0331** (0.0157) -0.0304* (0.0155) -0.0167 (0.0170) -0.0143 (0.0167) 
INDUSTRY -0.0103 (0.0095) -0.0076 (0.0094) -0.0137 (0.0100) -0.0126 (0.0098) 
TLISTED 0.0059 (0.0163) -0.0026 (0.0163) 0.0082 (0.0174) -0.0001 (0.0173) 
CASH -0.0127 (0.0118) -0.0164 (0.0117) -0.0189 (0.0127) -0.0235* (0.0125) 
GROWTH 0.0062 (0.0106) 0.0075 (0.0104) 0.0233 (0.0155) 0.0221 (0.0152) 
ADVISORS  0.0284*** (0.0098)   0.0310** (0.0103) 
BOARDSIZE     -0.0123 (0.0161) -0.0179 (0.0159) 
INDEPENDENT    0.0019 (0.0097) 0.0011 (0.0096) 
DUALITY     -0.0057 (0.0122) -0.0067 (0.0120) 
Intercept 0.0725 (0.0327) 0.0648 (0.0324) 0.1478 (0.0515) 0.1406 (0.0506) 
Observations 300  300  236  236  
R-squared 0.0310  0.0581  0.0699  0.1061  
         
CAR (-5, +5)         
STATE -0.0096 (0.0332) -0.0044 (0.0328) 0.0264 (0.0389) 0.0391 (0.0384) 
SIZE 0.0015 (0.0023) 0.0010 (0.0022) -0.0011 (0.0028) -0.0010 (0.0027) 
AGE -0.0005 (0.0086) 0.0006 (0.0085) 0.0000 (0.0093) 0.0036 (0.0092) 
HIGHTECH -0.0245 (0.0228) -0.0206 (0.0226) 0.0027 (0.0262) 0.0066 (0.0258) 
INDUSTRY 0.0129 (0.0138) 0.0169 (0.0137) 0.0099 (0.0154) 0.0118 (0.0151) 
TLISTED -0.0068 (0.0237) -0.0194 (0.0238) 0.0072 (0.0269) -0.0058 (0.0267) 
CASH -0.0095 (0.0172) -0.0151 (0.0171) -0.0131 (0.0196) -0.0203 (0.0193) 
GROWTH 0.0020 (0.0154) 0.0040 (0.0152) -0.0186 (0.0239) -0.0204 (0.0234) 
ADVISORS  0.0421*** (0.0143)   0.0489*** (0.0159) 
BOARDSIZE     0.0046 (0.0249) -0.0041 (0.0246) 
INDEPENDENT    0.0076 (0.0150) 0.0064 (0.0148) 
DUALITY     0.0042 (0.0188) 0.0027 (0.0185) 
Intercept -0.0018 (0.0476) -0.0133 (0.0472) -0.0440 (0.0795) -0.0554 (0.0781) 
Observations 300  300  236  236  
R-squared 0.0100  0.0387  0.0109  0.0511  
Note: Standards errors are in parenthesis; *, ** and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Cumulative abnormal return for the 2 days window for the different sub-samples. 
CAR (-1, +1)   Sub-sample Asian  Sub-sample non-Asian   Sub-sample Chinese 
STATE 0.0017 (0.0346) 0.0274 (0.0207) -0.0419 (0.0439) 
SIZE -0.0044* (0.0023) -0.0016 (0.0019) -0.0055* (0.0030) 
AGE -0.0041 (0.0081) 0.0085 (0.0073) 0.0119 (0.0126) 
HIGHTECH -0.0330 (0.0199) 0.0562** (0.0214) -0.0143 (0.0294) 
INDUSTRY -0.0121 (0.0126) 0.0005 (0.0095) -0.0204 (0.0202) 
TLISTED 0.0203 (0.0264) 0.0042 (0.0145) -0.0565 (0.0559) 
CASH -0.0263 (0.0167) -0.0220* (0.0128) -0.0070 (0.0275) 
GROWTH 0.0159 (0.0140) 0.0220 (0.0134) -0.0026 (0.0593) 
ADVISORS 0.0334** (0.0134) 0.0079 (0.0099) 0.0294 (0.0235) 
BOARDSIZE -0.0371 (0.0227) 0.0160 (0.0159) 0.0152 (0.0438) 
INDEPENDENT 0.0193 (0.0134) 0.0028 (0.0102) 0.0211 (0.0294) 
DUALITY -0.0170 (0.0147) -0.0028 (0.0170) -0.0599** (0.0237) 
Intercept 0.1922 (0.0699) -0.0043 (0.0568) 0.0134 (0.1821) 
Observations 160  71  55  











5. Limitations and Future Research 
 Like any other study, this is not without limitations. The first comes with the 
employment of the event study methodology. Although a standard in this field, this 
methodology is grounded on the assumption that the financial markets react immediately to 
the announced information, and that its response is complete and unbiased. In addition to 
this, the model assumes a semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, meaning all 
CAR (-1, +1)      Sub-sample BRIC Sub-sample US target 
STATE 0.0037 (0.0196) 0.0077 (0.0621) 
SIZE -0.0010 (0.0015) -0.0017 (0.0035) 
AGE 0.0077 (0.0060) -0.0105 (0.0121) 
HIGHTECH -0.0022 (0.0156) -0.0445 (0.0266) 
INDUSTRY -0.0006 (0.0098) -0.0115 (0.0207) 
TLISTED 0.0144 (0.0197) -0.0039 (0.0654) 
CASH -0.0227* (0.0127) -0.0495* (0.0260) 
GROWTH 0.0184 (0.0178) 0.0252 (0.0175) 
ADVISORS 0.0164 (0.0101) 0.0158 (0.0211) 
BOARDSIZE -0.0220 (0.0169) -0.0124 (0.0380) 
INDEPENDENT 0.0156 (0.0099) 0.0322* (0.0177) 
DUALITY -0.0064 (0.0111) -0.0144 (0.0204) 
Intercept 0.0760 (0.0542) 0.1475 (0.1001) 
Observations 134  52  
R-squared 0.1072  0.2986  
Note: Standards errors are in parenthesis; *, ** and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 




new public information is believed to be reflected in the prices. It is, however, fair to believe 
that not all investors fully understand all the mechanisms surrounding the transactions, 
especially knowing that these deals can be extremely complex.  
A second limitation stems from the measurement of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is a complex area, whose quality is difficult to access in solely quantitative 
measures. When using quantitative measurements, it would, ideally, include more variables, 
corresponding both from company-specific principles and nation-wide regulations. Hence, 
the two variables used are relevant, but conclusions should be drawn sensibly from them.  
Another limitation is the sample size. 300 deals constitute a sizeable sample, but it is 
not big enough to allow for the construction of significant sub-samples that bring relevant 
results. The last limitation is related to the time range considered. Between 2005 and 2020 
there was a world financial crisis which started in 2008. This crisis affected the world 
economy and it might have affected M&A transactions and the way investors perceive its 
value.  
From these limitations, some avenues of future research arise. There is room for 
research in the impact of corporate governance using a more in-depth data collection on the 
matter considering more variables from both the acquirer and the target. It could also be 
interesting to study the impact the financial crisis had on shareholders’ wealth creation 
arising from this type of acquisitions.  
6. Managerial implications 
This study is relevant for management, as the conclusions presented affect managers’ 
decision-making. It is increasingly common for developing-market firms to want to expand 
and consider acquiring developed-market entities. It is, thus, increasingly important for the 
management of such firms to be informed of what the literature says about the impact those 
transactions have on shareholder wealth. It is important to note that this paper examines the 
market returns caused by the announcement of the acquisition, and it does not account for 
the post-acquisition performance or the long-term success of the transaction.  
From the conclusions drawn in this paper, several managerial implications arise. The 
first one is the general recommendation for undertaking this type of investment, since these 
acquisitions, on average, create value. Then, when deciding to proceed with an acquisition, 
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the use of financial advisors is recommended, as they are proved to contribute significantly 
for the value creation. The results of this study also suggest that it might be beneficial to opt 
for a stock or mix-stock mode of payment, instead of paying all-cash, and that acquiring 
firms that belong to related industries does not necessarily mean the investment is safer. 
These are the main takeaways from this paper that give emerging-market firms’ managers 
more insights so to take more informed decisions with greater chances of success. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper’s goal is to understand shareholder wealth creation for the new and growing 
phenomenon of developing-country firms acquiring developed-country targets. For that, the 
event study methodology was used, which is a standard in M&A literature. This study uses 
a sample of 300 deals from 2005 to 2020 from listed acquirers of ten different developing 
countries. The targets are mostly from European countries, with 166 transactions, and from 
the US with 65. The market model was used to calculate the abnormal returns and the 
cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are positive for the interval of two days 
before the acquisition until one day after, being statistically significant for the day of the 
announcement and the day after at a 1% level, which leads to the deduction that the financial 
markets react quickly to the announcements. The cumulative abnormal returns were 
calculated using three event windows to capture possible earlier information leaks and delays 
in investors’ reactions. For the three event windows – (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) – the 
CARs are positive. For the two first windows they are significant at a 1% level and take a 
value of almost 2%. These results show an unequivocal value creation, confirming the first 
hypothesis.  
Five sub-samples were created according to the country of origin and the country of the 
target for a better understanding of the behaviour of the markets. By analysing the CARs for 
the sub-samples, it is possible to find the same positive and statistically significant market 
reactions for the Asian, Chinese and BRIC acquirers. For the sub-samples of non-Asian 
acquirers and of US targets, there is no evidence of statistically significant effects, although 
the CARs are positive. 
A cross-sectional analysis was then constructed, using the CARs as the dependent 
variable. From the cross-sectional analysis, the use of financial advisors was proven to be 
beneficial, as hypothesized, having a statistically significant and positive effect. The same 
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could not be found for the corporate governance hypothesis. Evidence of a positive impact 
of board independence was only found for the sub-sample of US targets and the statistically 
significant negative effect of CEO duality was only observed for the sub-sample of Chinese 
firms. Hence, the model gives evidence to validate the financial advisors’ hypothesis, but 
not the corporate governance one. 
The control variables used gave robustness to the model and also gave rise to interesting 
takeaways. Being state-owned was shown to have a small but positive and statistically 
significant effect on market returns, showing investors are more confident of the success of 
acquisitions from state-owned companies. Another finding was that firm size and all-cash 
payments are associated with value destruction. Being high tech also yields a negative effect 
for the whole sample, but a positive effect when studying solely non-Asian bidders. Lastly, 
higher GDP growth rates of the acquirer’s home country lead to higher returns. 
As Narayan and Thenmozhi (2014) said, successful EMMs are expected to continue to 
acquire developed-market targets. Thus, this phenomenon will continue to be observed, and 
EMMs will continue to gain ground in the global market and further close the gap between 
them and developing economies and their players. 
To conclude, acquisitions from emerging-market firms taking over developed-market 
targets is a relatively new and growing phenomenon. On average, these acquisitions, create 
value for the acquirer, with financial advisors significantly and positively impacting the 
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